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Judicial Review Reform Consultation  28 April 2021 
Ministry of Justice  
102 Petty France | London SW1H 9AJ 
Submission on Judicial Review: Proposals for Reform – ‘Prospective Invalidation/Overruling’ 
1. Executive Summary
1.1. The Government proposes at paragraphs [60]–[65] of its Consultation Report to provide 
judges a discretionary power to grant prospective-only remedies in judicial review 
proceedings. It further proposes at paragraphs [66]–[68] to legislate a presumption or a 
requirement of prospective-only remedies when statutory instruments are quashed. The 
Government’s Report relies on arguments made in Sir Stephen Laws QC’s IRAL Submission 
advocating for prospective-only judicial remedies. My submission responds to the content of 
both documents.  
1.2. The proposed prospective-only judicial remedies are known by various labels—‘prospective 
invalidation’, ‘prospective overruling’, ‘prospective revision’, and ‘non-retrospective judicial 
law-making’—but they all mean the same thing: that a judicial decision will determine the 
law for future cases but its holding will not govern past or current cases. In this submission I 
use the label ‘Prospective Invalidation’.  
1.3. The Government should abandon its proposal to legislate in favour of Prospective Invalidation 
in the judicial review context (and in any other context) because: 
a. Prospective Invalidation violates the rule of law as propounded by Professor Albert
Venn Dicey in his seminal treatise on The Law of the Constitution.
b. Prospective Invalidation is inconsistent with the English common law judicial method
and the declaratory theory of adjudication that underpins common law reasoning.
c. Prospective Invalidation effects bad policy. The Government’s interest in this doctrine
is surprising given that the Prospective Invalidation doctrine is well-recognised to be
2 
the ultimate instrument of ‘judicial activism’.1 The doctrine was developed by jurists 
who favour judicial activism and who sought to implement radical judicial changes in 
the law untethered from the usual retrospective effects of judicial decision-making. It 
leads to more uncertainty and instability in the law, not less.  
d. Prospective Invalidation has been denounced by prominent apex courts around the
common law world, even while it has increasingly found acceptance with civilian and
European courts. The Government’s proposal would isolate the courts of the United
Kingdom from comparable common law jurisdictions. It would push UK judges to
adopt reasoning and remedies more commonly employed by European courts.
e. Prospective Invalidation is unnecessary and has been rejected by scholars who have
analysed the doctrine in England.
1.4. Instead of Prospective Invalidation, if the Government considers that the burdens of a 
particular judgment against it are too great to bear, the preferable alternative is for the 
Government to rely on remedial retroactive legislation in response.  
1.5. Instead of Prospective Invalidation, there may be merit in providing judges a discretion to 
quash government acts with suspended effect as considered at paragraph [69] of the 
Government’s Consultation Report. Suspended Quashing Orders should be discretionary, not 
presumptive or mandatory. Any legislation in favour of Suspended Quashing Orders should 
clarify that it is only the remedy that is suspended, not the reasons underlying the order.  
1.6. Finally, I agree with the proposals at paragraphs [98] and [99] of the Government’s 
Consultation Report regarding the desirability of reforming the time limits for bringing a 
judicial review claim.  
2. Credentials
2.1. This submission is made in my capacity as a legal academic and not on behalf of my 
academic institution.  
2.2. I am an Assistant Professor of Law at the Peter A. Allard School of Law, The University of 
British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. I previously resided and practised law in London, 
England, and taught at the Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London. I hold a 
master’s and a doctorate of laws from Harvard Law School and undergraduate degrees in law 
and economics from The University of Auckland. I am admitted to the roll of Barristers and 
Solicitors in New Zealand.  
2.3. My academic specialisations concern civil liability, the temporal effects of judicial decisions, 
1 Keith Mason QC (Solicitor-General for New South Wales), ‘Prospective Overruling’ (1989) 63 Aust LJ 526, 530. 
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and statutes of limitations. I have published on these subjects in leading British law journals2 
and other law reviews around the common law world. I teach a seminar on Law’s Temporal 
Dimensions at Allard Law.  
2.4. I analysed the doctrine of Prospective Invalidation in my doctoral dissertation at Harvard Law 
School, demonstrating how it is unprincipled and effects bad policy. My work was awarded 
the HLS Constitutional Law Prize and was published in the leading US law review.3  
2.5. In light of my research on the subject, I emphatically disagree with the proposal to legislate in 
favour of either discretionary or mandatory prospective-only remedies in judicial review. The 
Government’s proposal will not curb judicial quashing of laws. It may well exacerbate it.  
3. Retrospective Invalidation does not violate the rule of law
3.1. The Government’s Consultation Report at paragraph [68] and Sir Stephen’s IRAL Submission 
at paragraph [119] assert that retrospective judicial invalidation of legislation violates the rule 
of law, and that prescribing a doctrine of Prospective Invalidation will better serve the rule of 
law. Neither documents cite scholarly, judicial, or any other authority in support of this 
assertion.  
3.2. What the Government proposes is an exception to the norm of judicial retrospectivity. 
Prospective Invalidation is an unorthodox doctrine, which is why it is not already widely 
employed by courts.  
3.3. Judge-made law is part of the British constitution. According to Professor A.V. Dicey, the 
British constitution ‘is a judge-made constitution, and it bears on its face all the features, 
good and bad, of judge-made law’.4  
3.4. Retrospectivity is a feature of judge-made law. That is because judicial decision-making 
entails interpreting what the law was that applied to disputes that arose in the past and are now 
being litigated. This is widely recognised and in most cases is wholly uncontroversial. 
Retrospectivity is one of the features that distinguishes judge-made law from statute law 
2 E.g. S. Beswick, ‘The Overpaid Tax Litigation: Roadblocked’ (2021) 84 Modern Law Review _; S. Beswick, 
‘Discoverability Principles and the Law’s Mistakes’ (2020) 136 Law Quarterly Review 139.  
3 S. Beswick, ‘Retroactive Adjudication’ (2020) 130 Yale Law Journal 276. For an English perspective and critique, see 
my forthcoming article (currently under review) which will be uploaded to https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820990.  
4 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, Liberty Classics, reprint 1982) 116; see M.D. 
Walters, A.V. Dicey and the Common Law Constitutional Tradition: A Legal Turn of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2020) 253–254. Sir Stephen Laws QC’s IRAL Submission (EIN 71, 12 March 2021) mischaracterises the role of the 
judiciary in democratic society and the nature of judicial decision-making. At paragraph [2] he contrasts ‘on the one hand, the 
two “political institutions” of the constitution that have democratic legitimacy’ with ‘on the other, the courts and the judiciary’. 
But an independent judiciary has democratic legitimacy and is fundamental to democracy and the rule of law. Sir Stephen’s 
IRAL Submission cites no authority supporting his radical proposals to legislate in favour of prospective-only remedies.  
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(which is presumptively prospective-only).5 
3.5. Prominent theorists of English law, including Professors H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, John 
Finnis, and John Gardner, have shown that judicial retrospectivity does not presumptively 
violate the rule of law even when it involves overruling or invalidating rules.6  
3.6. To suggest, as Sir Stephen does at paragraph [119] of his IRAL Submission, that retrospective 
judicial invalidation of legislation imposes ‘a form of injustice and unfairness that is wholly 
incompatible with even the narrowest versions of the concept of the rule of law’ not only 
misunderstands the British constitutional position. It impugns the legal systems of the UK’s 
closest common law allies. Courts in the United States, Canada and Australia (among many 
other democratic countries) have long routinely exercised a power to quash primary and 
secondary legislation with retrospective effect. These countries have the rule of law.7  
4. Prospective Invalidation violates Dicey’s rule of law
4.1. Professor A.V. Dicey penned the definitive account of the rule of law in Britain. Dicey 
characterised the rule of law as having three meanings:8 
[a.] It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular 
law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of 
arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of 
the government. … 
[b.] It means, again, equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to 
the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary Law Courts; the “rule of 
law” in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others from the 
duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the jurisdiction of 
the ordinary tribunals; …. The notion … that affairs or disputes in which the 
government or its servants are concerned are beyond the sphere of the civil Courts 
and must be dealt with by special and more or less official bodies … is utterly 
unknown to the law of England, and indeed is fundamentally inconsistent with our 
traditions and customs.  
5 J. Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 41–42; cf Laws 
(n 4) [125].  
6 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 276; J. Raz, The Authority of Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 198; J. Raz, ‘Facing Up: A Reply’ (1989) 62 S Cal L Rev 1153, 1209–1212; J.M. 
Finnis, ‘The Fairy Tale’s Moral’ (1999) 115 LQR 170, 174–175; J.M. Finnis, ‘Judicial Law-Making and the “Living” 
Instrumentalisation of the ECHR’ in N.W. Barber, R. Ekins and P. Yowell (eds), Lord Sumption and the Limits of the Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) 79; Gardner (n 5) 41–42; see also L.L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (New York: FA Praeger, 
1968) 89–103; T.A.O. Endicott, Vagueness in Law (OUP 2000) 193; T. Endicott, ‘Adjudication and the Law’ (2007) 27 OJLS 
311, 317–320, 326; M. Kramer Objectivity and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 119–122; P. 
Jaffey, ‘Authority in the Common Law’ (2011) 36 Austl J Leg Phil 1, 27; P. Jaffey, ‘Two Ways to Understand the Common 
Law’ (2017) 8 Juris 435, 456; P. Jaffey, ‘Policy and Principle and the Character of Private Law’ (2020) 11 Juris 387, 400.  
7 A.V. Dicey considered that ‘The rule of law is as marked a feature of the United States as of England’, notwithstanding 
the US courts’ powers of strong judicial review, which were well-recognised at the time Dicey wrote: Dicey (n 4) 119.  
8 Dicey (n 4) 120–121; see further ibid 110–119; see also Walters (n 4) 247–255. 
5 
[c.] The “rule of law,” lastly, may be used as a formula for expressing the fact that 
with us the law[s] of the constitution … are not the source but the consequence of 
the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the Courts; that, in short, the 
principles of private law have with us been by the action of the Courts and 
Parliament so extended as to determine the position of the Crown and of its servants; 
thus the constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land. 
4.2. The proposal to legislate in favour of Prospective Invalidation violates all three of Dicey’s 
conceptions of the rule of law: 
a. Supremacy of Law: The proposal expands the scope for unchecked government
discretion by shielding executive decisions and secondary legislation from the full
consequences of a judicial finding of invalidity. Executive decisions and secondary
legislation that are made without lawful authority or without following the proper
process will continue to govern past events as ‘pretended laws’, rather than being
quashed for invalidity and cases being determined on the basis of a court’s
understanding of the proper governing law. The proposal essentially allows and
forgives unlawful executive action. Sir Stephen suggests that government officials ‘only
inadvertently’ act outside of the law9—yet for such conduct to go unremedied violates
the prohibition on arbitrary power. Sir Stephen also recognises that Prospective
Invalidation carries the risk ‘perhaps, that government would take the opportunity to
make ultra vires instruments in bad faith, with a view to waiting to see if they will be
overturned, while remaining content that they will be effective in the meantime’.10 This
is an obvious possible risk that illustrates how Prospective Invalidation violates the rule
of law.
b. Equality before Law: The proposal creates more favourable juridical rules for
government that do not apply to ordinary citizens. Ordinary disputes are resolved by
courts determining the proper interpretation of the law and applying their decision to
parties retrospectively. A party is not shielded merely because a court’s decision takes it
by surprise. It would violate the principle of equality under law for the Crown to be
shielded from the retrospective effect of judicial decisions when other defendants are
not so shielded. Unequal treatment is further illustrated by Sir Stephen’s suggestion that
the burden should fall on claimants to rebut a presumption in favour of non-
retrospectivity of judicial decisions concerning government,11 rather than placing the
burden on the Crown to demonstrate why exceptional treatment is warranted.
c. Ordinary Law: The maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (‘where there is a right, there is a
9 Laws (n 4) [132].  
10 Laws (n 4) [131]. 
11 Laws (n 4) [135]. 
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remedy’), according to Dicey, ‘runs through the English constitution’ reflecting ‘that 
inseparable connection between the means of enforcing a right and the right to be 
enforced which is the strength of judicial legislation’.12 The Government’s proposal 
provides for rights without remedies, violating this fundamental maxim of English law. 
Claimants who successfully challenge the validity of some regulation that affected them 
would be prevented from seeking to undo its impact on them.  
Dicey saw the suspension by Parliament of ordinary judicial recourse as a potentially 
grave violation of the rule of law. Dicey considered that ‘in England the law of the 
constitution is little else than a generalisation of the rights which the Courts secure to 
individuals’.13 He continued, ‘The constitution being based on the rule of law, the 
suspension of the constitution, as far as such a thing can be conceived possible, would 
mean with us nothing less than a revolution.’14  
4.3. In debates accompanying the passage of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) 
Bill, Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg MP proclaimed that with Brexit ‘Dicey’s constitution has been 
restored’.15 Regrettably, the Government’s proposal to legislate in favour of Prospective 
Invalidation violates the rule of law under the British constitution as formalised by Dicey.  
5. Prospective Invalidation is unprincipled
5.1. The Government’s proposal would fundamentally change the nature of judging in the UK. 
The idea that judges can separate the forward-looking precedential effects of their decisions 
from the backward-looking retrospective effects contravenes orthodox understandings of the 
common law judicial method. Lord Devlin thought such a proposal ‘crosses the Rubicon that 
divides the judicial and the legislative powers. It turns judges into undisguised legislators.’16 
He warned that to cross that Rubicon—as the Government now proposes—‘would be to make 
a profound constitutional change with incalculable consequences’.17  
5.2. The responsibility of judges is to decide cases within the constraints of the declaratory theory 
of adjudication. Professor John Finnis has given the best contemporary explanation of the 
declaratory theory. It bears setting out:18  
The declaratory theory of law is not and never was put forward as a description of 
the history of our law—a history that includes many changes in the common law and 
12 Dicey (n 4) 118.  
13 Dicey (n 4) 119.  
14 Dicey (n 4) 120; see Walters (n 4) 253–254, 297–298.  
15 Second Reading of European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill (Hansard vol. 620, col. 907, 31 January 2017). 
16 Lord Devlin, ‘Judges and Lawmakers’ (1976) 39 MLR 1, 11.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Finnis, ‘Judicial Law-Making’ (n 6) 76–79, quoting Finnis, ‘The Fairy Tale’s Moral’ (n 6) 172.  
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in interpretations of statute law, changes which may go beyond development to 
abrogation. Rather, it is a statement of the judge’s vocation and responsibility. … 
Adjudication is the effort to identify the rights of the contending parties now by 
identifying what were, in law, the rights and wrongs, or validity or invalidity, of 
their actions and transactions when entered upon and done. If those [actions and 
transactions] rested on a view of the law then widely settled, the judge may 
nonetheless have the duty now to take and act upon a contrary view of the law if 
(a) adhering to that former view would conflict with other elements of our law—
notably with principles of law and other judicially cognizable policies and
standards—applicable then and now to the parties, (b) departing from that former
view would not collide with duties specific to the judge (for example the duty to
follow a recent decision of the court immediately superior in the hierarchy), and
(c) departing from the formerly settled view would not be an injustice to the
parties before the court. …
[Judges’] determinations of the law will in reality be applied to past dealings and 
inter-relations of the parties before the court, and can only be just and properly 
judicial if they state law that can reasonably be said to have been the law that, all 
things now considered, was properly applicable at the time (even if not then 
generally recognised as such). … 
For doing justice according to law—the peculiarly judicial responsibility—is a 
matter neither of mediating nor of legislating, but of finding the law that is 
applicable to the lis because it was the law governing the parties as they interacted 
(at the relevant past time(s)) in a way allegedly giving rise to a cause in action, and 
then by applying that law so as to give to each their legal entitlement. …  
5.3. Judges may only quash rules and decisions that are recognised as having been contrary to the 
law that ‘was properly applicable at the time (even if not then generally recognised as such)’. 
That is why judicial retrospectivity is justified and compatible with the rule of law. The 
judge’s decision sets out the law that properly governed the parties at the time they acted. It 
resolves their dispute.  
5.4. A rule is not a law merely because it is found in a statutory instrument. It is a law if it has 
been validly enacted. It is the judicial role to say when a rule has not been validly enacted and 
is not law. This is not ‘only legal tradition’ and ‘historical feature’, nor ‘only adherence to 
long-established legal rules’, as Sir Stephen asserts.19 It is, as Professor Finnis says, ‘the 
judicial responsibility’.20  
5.5. Prospective Invalidation contravenes the common law judicial method by preventing the 
court’s considered understanding of the law that governed the parties before it from actually 
applying to the parties’ dispute. It empowers judges to declare what they think the law should 
be going forward, rather than constraining judges to declare what the law is. Prospective 
19 Laws (n 4) [123] and [201]. 
20 Finnis, ‘Judicial Law-Making’ (n 6) 76; see also J. Finnis, ‘Judicial Power: Past, Present and Future’ in R. Ekins (ed), 
Judicial Power and the Balance of Our Constitution (Policy Exchange, 2018) 30–33.  
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Invalidation affords judges quasi-legislative power, which they do not and should not 
exercise.  
6. Prospective Invalidation effects bad policy and encourages judicial activism
6.1. The Government’s Consultation Report errs in assuming at paragraph [70] that Prospective 
Invalidation will ‘provide clarity and certainty to the use of executive powers, while also 
providing for clear safety valves by which the courts can find the appropriate and just 
outcome where required’.  
6.2. Prospective Invalidation will not improve certainty, reliance, or efficiency in the law. Rather, 
these values weigh in favour of rejecting the Prospective Invalidation doctrine. 
a. Certainty: The claim that Prospective Invalidation is necessary to preserve certainty
and stability in the law rests on a false premise: namely, that ‘It is inherent in anything
of a legislative nature (whether primary or secondary) that, once it is in place, it will be
relied on, and assumed to be valid, by those subject to it’.21 People do not uniformly
assume that rules are valid merely because they have been enacted. At most, we can say
concerning controversial rules that people may hold different views as to whether some
rule is valid law or not. In a democratic society people have the right to test the vires of
rules affecting them before the courts. In the sorts of cases that have influenced the
Government’s proposal on this subject, courts have quashed rules because (at least
some) people believed those rules were not valid law. When a court quashes a rule, it is
vindicating the rights of those people who believed—correctly, it turns out—that the
rule was not valid law. Judicial quashing orders are a response to instability and
uncertainty in the law that already exists. They are the necessary solution to the
conflicts in views in society that can arise as to the validity of rules.
The best way for a court to restore stability and certainty in the law is for the court to
determine the proper state of the law and apply its decision to parties retrospectively.
Prospective Invalidation exacerbates confusion as to the validity of an impugned rule by
curtailing courts from saying what the law was that governed the parties before it.
b. Reliance: Retrospective invalidation of legislation does not ‘impose injustice and
unfairness on those who have reasonably relied on its validity in the past’.22 The reason
that an impugned rule (which some people will have relied on) may be quashed is
because it conflicts with another superior rule of law (which other people will have
relied on). Parties on both sides may reasonably place reliance on their respective
positions regarding the rule: that it is either valid, or that it is invalid. It is the court’s
21 Laws (n 4) [118].  
22 cf Laws (n 4) [119]. 
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job to say who is right. If a court quashes a rule for being invalid, then we can say the 
reliance interests of those who opposed the rule were stronger (and more reasonable) 
than the reliance interests of those who acted on the basis of the impugned rule.  
In litigation there are winners and losers. Those who succeed on the merits are entitled 
to have their case resolved according to the properly governing law. Prospective 
Invalidation undermines the reliance and expectation interests of successful parties to 
litigation by giving them a hollow victory. It recognises the correctness of their legal 
position but denies them the remedies that would vindicate the claims on which they 
relied. As the Government recognises at paragraph [61], its proposal ‘could’ (surely, 
would) ‘lead to an immediate unjust outcome for many of those who have already been 
affected by an improperly made policy’. It essentially turns the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations on its head by privileging the interests of government above individual 
claimants.23  
c. Judicial efficiency: The great merit of judicial retrospectivity is that it discourages
radical judicial changes in the law. Since judges have to justify their interpretations of
the law governing past disputes, when presented with an opportunity for law-making
judges must ‘bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which
contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into’.24
The Prospective Invalidation doctrine unshackles judges from having to think about the
retrospective consequences of their decisions. It thereby frees judges to engage in more
ambitious and creative decision-making. The doctrine’s major feature ‘is its capacity to
encourage judicial activism’.25 If the Government enacts its proposal, it will
counterintuitively enable judges to quash rules more readily.
d. Governmental efficiency: The extent to which a quashing order will cause
administrative or fiscal chaos will vary depending on the circumstances of each case. A
one-size-fits-all presumption or requirement of Prospective Invalidation is overkill. It is
also unpersuasive that the burden of a drafter’s or an administrator’s error should fall on
those individuals affected by it, as opposed to being borne by the Crown and spread
across society as a whole. Finally, to the extent that special protection for the Crown is
thought to be necessary, exceptional cases can be curtailed by resort to (exceptional)
retroactive legislation, which is a preferable alternative to Prospective Invalidation
(discussed further at Section 10. below).
23 cf G. Weeks, ‘What Can We Legitimately Expect from the State?’ in M. Groves and G. Weeks (eds), Legitimate 
Expectations in the Common Law World (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) 147–164. 
24 Practice Statement on Judicial Precedent [1966] 1 WLR 1234 (HL). 
25 Mason (n 1) 531.  
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6.3. The Government’s proposal is unnecessary. Judicial quashing orders do not unsettle 
transactions and arrangements perpetually into the past. The law already draws a principled 
line between justiciable cases and those closed off by time-bars, defences, and the doctrines of 
justiciability, res judicata, and estoppel.  
7. English judges have not endorsed Prospective Invalidation
7.1. The Government’s Consultation Report at paragraph [62] intimates that ‘Judges have 
recognised the benefit of prospective-only remedies’ and it quotes as supporting authority R 
(Hurley and Moore) v Secretary of State for Business Innovation & Skills [2012] EWHC 201 
(Admin) [99] (Elias LJ). This judgment did not result in the quashing of a regulation and the 
quoted paragraph does not support the asserted claim. The paragraph has not been quoted in 
full. Nowhere does Elias LJ suggest that a just outcome can be reached by judges using 
prospective-only remedies to avoid ‘administrative chaos’. Elias LJ does not consider 
prospective-only remedies at all. To the contrary, in the second half of paragraph [99], which 
is missing from the quotation in the Government’s Consultation Report, Elias LJ intimates 
that retrospectively quashing invalid regulations would be a just remedy, ‘however 
inconvenient that might be’.  
7.2. There is a wealth of judicial dicta affirming and justifying the retrospectivity of judge-made 
law26 and denouncing the doctrine of Prospective Invalidation.27 The leading House of Lords 
decision considering the doctrine, Re Spectrum Plus, was ultimately circumspect about the 
doctrine’s merits. Lord Scott in that case considered that even if prospective overruling of 
judgments might be acceptable, it would never be proper to apply the technique to the 
interpretation of statutes.28 Re Spectrum Plus has more recently been interpreted by Supreme 
Court judges as affirming the orthodoxy that when a court concludes that an earlier rule was 
wrong, ‘then it will overrule it, and with retrospective effect, with little scope for considering 
the risks to the security of settled transactions’.29  
8. Prospective Invalidation has been denounced by comparable common law courts
8.1. The Prospective Invalidation doctrine originated in the United States and reached its heyday 
in the 1960s. The Supreme Court of the United States has since abandoned the doctrine. The 
leading precedent on the temporal effect of judicial decisions in non-criminal cases is a 1993 
26 E.g. Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2020] UKSC 
47, [2020] STC 2387, [273] per Lord Briggs and Lord Sales; Samsoondar v Capital Insurance Company Ltd [2020] UKPC 33, 
[13] per Lord Burrows; AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC 86, [35] per Lord Hope,
[76] per Lord Brown, [121] per Lord Reed.
27 See cases cited in R (Wright) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 67, [42] per Ward LJ.
28 Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41, [2005] 2 AC 680, [127]; see Samsoondar [2020] UKPC 33, [13].
29 Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2020] UKSC 47,
[2020] STC 2387, [293] per Lord Briggs and Lord Sales; see ibid [99] per Lord Reed and Lord Hodge. 
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judgment (concerning claims for restitution of ultra vires taxes), which held that:30 
When [the Supreme] Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that 
rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive 
effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of 
whether such events predate or postdate the announcement of the rule. 
8.2. The High Court of Australia has also rejected the doctrine as inimical to the judicial method.31 
8.3. In a 2007 case a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed use of the doctrine in 
exceptional cases,32 but in practice Prospective Invalidation is almost never used as Canadian 
courts prefer to invoke the doctrine of Suspended Declarations of Invalidity instead.33  
8.4. A majority of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in its leading case considering the doctrine 
declined to take up the opportunity to address whether New Zealand courts have, or should 
have, the power to exercise it.34  
8.5. The Prospective Invalidation doctrine has found comparatively greater acceptance among 
European national and supranational courts.35 Whereas Brexit could usher ‘renewed vigour 
and inspiration in our common [Commonwealth] common law heritage’,36 the Government’s 
proposal would isolate UK courts from comparable common law jurisdictions and push UK 
judges to adopt reasoning and remedies more commonly employed by European courts.  
9. Prospective Invalidation is rejected by leading common law scholars on the subject
9.1. The leading analyses of this doctrine as it arises in English law are Professor Charles J.G. 
Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 209–
227 and Dr. Ben Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing Plc, 2008) 209–218.37 Professor Sampford finds the doctrine controversial and 
30 Harper v Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 US 86, 97 (1993), affirmed in Landgraf v USI Film Prods, 511 US 244, 279 
n.32 (1994); Reynoldsville Casket Co v Hyde, 514 US 749, 752 (1995); see W. Baude, ‘“Retroactive” Liability after Barr v.
AAPC’ (The Volokh Conspiracy, 20 April 2021) (summarising a recent US federal district court judgment applying Harper).
31 Ha v New South Wales [1997] HCA 34, (1997) 189 CLR 465, 504, affirmed in Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow [2019] 
HCA 29, [55] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ, [94]–[98] per Edelman J.  
32 Canada v Hislop, 2007 SCC 10, [2007] 1 SCR 429, [81]–[108] per LeBel and Rothstein JJ; cf [140] per Bastarache J. 
33 L. Smith, ‘Canada: The Rise of Judgments with Suspended Effect’ in E. Steiner (ed), Comparing the Prospective Effect 
of Judicial Rulings Across Jurisdictions (Cham: Springer, 2015) 254–257.  
34 Chamberlains v Lai [2006] NZSC 70, [2007] 2 NZLR 7, [95] per Elias CJ, Gault and Keith JJ; cf [140] per Tipping J, 
[205] per Thomas J; see Department of Corrections v Gardiner [2017] NZCA 608, [2018] 2 NZLR 712, [17] per Miller J.
35 See discussions of the Prospective Invalidation doctrine in various European jurisdictions in P. Popelier and others (eds),
The Effects of Judicial Decisions in Time (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014) and E. Steiner (ed), Comparing the Prospective Effect 
of Judicial Rulings Across Jurisdictions (Cham: Springer, 2015).  
36 Lord Philip Sales, ‘Implications of Brexit and Covid-19 for UK Law’ (New Zealand Senior Courts Judges’ Conference, 
Tauranga, 15 April 2021).  
37 See also B. Juratowitch, ‘The Temporal Effect of Judgments in the United Kingdom’ in P. Popelier and others (eds), The 
Effects of Judicial Decisions in Time (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014) 178; B. Juratowitch, ‘Questioning Prospective Overruling’ 
[2007] NZ L Rev 393, 414–415. 
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dubious. Dr. Juratowitch (now QC) concludes that Prospective Invalidation is constitutionally 
impermissible, contrary to the rule of law, and not a legitimate technique for English judges.  
9.2. Professor Michael D.A. Freeman, the learned editor of Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence 
(8th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), has also considered the doctrine and rejected it.38 
My own scholarship in the Yale Law Journal and elsewhere concludes similarly.39  
10. Retroactive legislation is a preferable alternative to Prospective Invalidation
10.1. Prospective Invalidation is unnecessary. Judges are not well-placed to assess the factors listed 
in the Government’s Consultation Report at paragraph [64] in order to determine when the 
Crown might need special protection. The Government, however, is. If the Government 
considers that the burdens of a particular judgment against it are too great to bear, the 
Government has the power to introduce remedial retroactive legislation in response.  
10.2. The now-President of the Supreme Court, the Right Hon Lord Reed of Allermuir, affirmed in 
AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate that remedial retroactive legislation can be 
legitimate, stating:40  
[T]here can be no doubt that justification for [legislation which alters rights and
obligations retrospectively] sometimes exists. It may exist, in particular, when the
legislation has a remedial purpose. As [Professor Lon] Fuller remarked, at p 53:
“It is when things go wrong that the retroactive statute often becomes 
indispensable as a curative measure; though the proper movement of law is 
forward in time, we sometimes have to stop and turn about to pick up the pieces.” 
As I shall explain, this point has also been noted by the Strasbourg court. In 
particular, because judicial decisions normally operate retrospectively in accordance 
with the declaratory theory of adjudication, such decisions may upset existing 
expectations or arrangements …. … 
In such circumstances, retrospective legislation which restores the position to what it 
was previously understood to be may not be incompatible with legal certainty or the 
rule of law.  
11. Discretionary Suspended Quashing Orders may be a meritorious alternative
11.1. The Government’s Consultation Report at paragraph [69] proposes legislating in favour of 
Suspended Quashing Orders. The Government proposes that judicial decisions to quash 
government acts should either be (a) presumptively suspended for a period of time, or 
(b) mandatorily suspended, subject to a public interest exception.
38 M.D.A. Freeman, ‘Standards of Adjudication, Judicial Law-Making and Prospective Overruling’ [1973] CLP 166, 207. 
39 Beswick (n 3).  
40 [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC 86, [121] per Lord Reed; see ibid [93] per Lord Mance; see also Dicey (n 4) 142–145. 
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11.2. I agree that Suspended Quashing Orders may be a meritorious alternative to Prospective 
Invalidation, subject to the following caveats: 
a. I disagree with the Government’s proposals that such orders should be either
presumptive or mandatory. They should be discretionary and exceptional. Whether a
quashing order is to be suspended, and for how long, should be left to the discretion of
the presiding judge, who is best-placed to tailor the remedy to the circumstances at
hand. There is a wealth of precedent from Canadian courts (where such orders have
become routine) that can provide guidance as to when a quashing order should be
suspended, as well as to the length of the period of suspension.41
b. Any legislation in favour of Suspended Quashing Orders should clarify that it is only
the remedy that is suspended, not the reasons underlying the order. The purpose of
suspending a quashing order is to allow the Government time to respond by passing
remedial legislation or regulations. After the period of suspension expires, judicial
remedies should apply in the ordinary way, unless they have been retroactively curtailed
or ousted by the Government’s remedial legislation or regulations during the period of
suspension.42
12. Time limitation reform is appropriate
12.1. Finally, I agree with the Government’s proposals at paragraphs [98] and [99] of its 
Consultation Report regarding the desirability of reforming the time limits for bringing a 
judicial review claim.  
12.2. As to paragraph [98]: I agree that the requirement for bringing a claim ‘promptly’ as set out in 
CPR 54.5(1)(a) should be removed. It is unnecessary and likely causes more cost than it 
avoids.  
12.3. As to paragraph [99]: I submit that the time limit for bringing a judicial review claim should 
be extended from three months to at least six months. Three months is a very short amount of 
time to assess one’s legal position and may contribute to claims being brought prematurely. A 
longer time limit would encourage pre-action resolution outside of the courts.  
13. Conclusion
13.1. The Government should abandon its proposal to legislate in favour of Prospective 
Invalidation. My answers to Questions 4 and 5 of the Government’s Consultation are: No, I 
do not agree with the proposed amendments to section 31 of the Senior Courts Act.  
41 Smith (n 33) 254–257; B. Bird, ‘The Judicial Notwithstanding Clause: Suspended Declarations of Invalidity’ (2019) 42 
Man LJ 23. 
42 Juratowitch, ‘The Temporal Effect of Judgments in the United Kingdom’ (n 37) 177; Smith (n 33) 254; Bird (n 41) 36. 
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13.2. If the Government considers that the burdens of a particular judgment against it are too great 
to bear, the preferable alternative is for the Government to rely on remedial retroactive 
legislation in response.  
13.3. Any legislation in favour of Suspended Quashing Orders should ensure that such orders are 
made at the discretion of the presiding judge and that it is only the remedy that is suspended, 
not the reasons underlying the order. My answer to Question 6 of the Government’s 
Consultation is: No, I do not agree there is merit in requiring suspended quashing orders, but I 
do think there may be merit in giving judges a discretion to exercise such orders. 
13.4. The requirement for bringing a claim ‘promptly’ should be removed from CPR 54.5(1)(a), 
and the time limit should be extended from three months to at least six months. My answers to 
Questions 9 and 10 of the Government’s Consultation are: Yes, I agree.  
Assistant Professor Samuel Beswick 
28 April 2021 
